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Abstract 
 
 
Background: On May 3, 2010 the Board of the American Joint Replacement Registry 
(AJRR) held its first meeting.  After decades of debate and examination of existing joint 
registries, the American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons (AAOS) has recently 
determined that establishing the AJRR is a worthwhile project.  This study will analyze 
the benefits and drawbacks of developing a national joint registry in the United States 
and will suggest the best design for the AJRR.  
Methods: In addition to conducting literature reviews of existing domestic and foreign 
joint registries, this study interviewed a variety of orthopaedic surgeons, including the 
chair of the AJRR, to gain unique perspectives on the future of an American joint 
registry.   
Results: Of 12 foreign national registries examined, 10 obtain the bulk of funding directly 
from the government, 9 are run by professional orthopaedic societies, and 6 mandate 
registry participation.  Domestic joint registry proponents claim benefits of registries to 
include detecting poorly performing implants, gathering epidemiological data, and 
determining risk factors for bad outcomes.  Major obstacles facing joint registries include 
the cost and burden of data collection and validation, encouraging surgeon participation, 
and determining what outcomes to measure. 
Conclusions:  Barriers to the successful establishment of a national joint registry in the 
United States include the vast scale and cost of data collection and the need to appease 
all major stakeholders (surgeons, device manufacturers, hospitals, patients, payers, and 
government).  If well-run, however, the AJRR could yield substantial benefits including 
the ability to detect poorly performing devices, gather epidemiological data, and 
ultimately improve the quality and value of total joint replacement. 
Clinical Relevance: The implementation of a national total joint registry in the US could 
have far-reaching influence on clinical orthopedics.  In the short-term, registry data could 
be used to facilitate recalls of defective devices and identify risk factors for peri-operative 
complications.  In the long-term, registry data could ultimately serve as a foundation for 
altering surgeon behaviors, limiting implant selection, and even determining which 
surgeons and hospitals should be performing total joint replacements. 
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National US Joint Registry was not only a good idea, but also a relatively straightforward 
problem to solve.  By following the model of other successful national registries, like that 
of Sweden, I felt the US could establish its own national joint registry without much 
difficulty.  What I learned by the culmination of this study, however, was that the 
American joint replacement industry presents a uniquely complex challenge for 
establishing a joint registry.  Much like the recent attempts of BP to manage an oil leak 
5,000ft below the ocean floor, the AJRR and its staff must create an entirely new model 
if they want to succeed in establishing the first National US Joint Registry.  While I still 
feel that the AJRR is a good idea with enormous potential to improve patient outcomes, I 
now understand how difficult the early years will be for the AJRR and am concerned it 
may suffer a fate similar to the earlier failed attempts at establishing a National US Joint 
Registry. 
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Introduction 
 In 2009, the American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons (AAOS) incorporated the 
American Joint Replacement Registry (AJRR) in Illinois 1 .  This moment marked the culmination 
of decades of research and debate over the value of total joint registries and the plausibility of 
creating a national joint registry in the United States 2-8 .  Despite the recent founding of the 
AJRR, the future of outcomes research in the American joint replacement industry is far from 
clear.  It will take months for the board of the AJRR to work out the complexities of establishing 
a national joint registry, and years for the database to achieve its goal of covering more than 
90% of hip and knee replacements 3, 9 .  The purpose of this study is to analyze the benefits and 
drawbacks of creating a national joint registry in the United States and to determine the best 
strategy for designing and implementing the AJRR. 
 According to the literature, the major benefits of joint registries include improving patient 
outcomes 10-15 , detecting underperforming devices 12, 14, 16-19 , and gathering epidemiological 
data on joint replacement 10, 12-14 .  In addition, a growing number of foreign and domestic joint 
registries have shown other benefits to include reduced revision rates and lower costs 12, 16, 20 .  
For example, over the lifetime of the Swedish joint registry, revision rates have decreased from 
17% to 7%, and the Australian registry reported a 0.6% reduction in revision rates over its first 
year 1, 7 .  By comparison, a 2% reduction in American revision rates could yield annual savings 
of $65.2 million, and as much as $1.3 billion over ten years 1 . 
 The major roadblocks to establishing joint registries include the reluctance of surgeons 
and hospitals to participate 10, 12, 16, 17, 19 , the high cost and burden of data collection and 
validation 10, 12, 14-17 , and a sense of inferiority compared to large randomized controlled trials 11, 
16 .  In addition, orthopaedic surgeons have expressed concern that a national joint registry may 
be used to constrict physician autonomy, decrease reimbursement, or increase liability risk 4, 21, 
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22 .  In the face of such challenges, several joint registries at home and abroad have struggled to 
produce worthwhile outcomes data 22, 23 . 
If the AJRR is to succeed, it must learn from the experiences of other joint registries and 
anticipate the unique challenges that an American joint registry will face.  As Dr. David 
Lewallen, Chair of the AJRR, said, “If we pull off a registry here in the US, in one year we’ll 
collect more data than all the other registries around the world… It’s kind of a staggering 
undertaking when you view it in that perspective 3 .”  Indeed, the challenge and potential value 
of establishing a national joint replacement registry in the United States is difficult to overstate.  
A well-run AJRR, estimated to cost between $18 and $20 million annually, could ultimately 
determine which joint implants, which operative techniques, and even which surgeons are best 
for patients undergoing total joint replacement.  Through a systematic literature review, an 
analysis of existing foreign and domestic joint registries, and in-depth interviews with key 
players in the founding of the AJRR, this study weighs the risks and benefits of establishing an 
American total joint registry and suggests the best design for the AJRR.  
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Methods 
 
To gain a variety of perspectives and opinions, this study used several different 
approaches to gather information on joint registries.  In addition to conducting a systematic 
literature review on joint registries (Appendix 1), I conducted separate focused literature reviews 
on the variety of outcomes to measure in joint replacement (Appendix 2), foreign national joint 
registries (Appendix 3), and regional US joint registries. Finally, a series of in-depth interviews 
with orthopaedic surgeons interested in joint registries or joint reconstruction provided opinions 
and insights otherwise unavailable in the literature. 
 Included in this text are the focused literature reviews that used PubMed and 
GoogleScholar to identify publications that discussed joint replacement outcomes measures or 
existing foreign and domestic joint registries.  The analysis excluded any national registries 
founded after 2004 since too little time has passed to fairly evaluate them, as well as any 
registries whose information was not available in the English literature.  Regional US joint 
registries were selected based on the information available in the literature, online, or through 
personal interviews. 
 After receiving Internal Review Board exemption, I recruited eight joint specialists with 
an interest in joint registries by email for an interview.  Five surgeons agreed to participate in the 
study and all were asked the same set of questions from an interview protocol.  The interviews 
were voice recorded, transcribed, and coded into summary tables (Appendix 4). 
 The major limitation of this study is the lack of opinions from stakeholders other than 
surgeons.  The bulk of the information in the literature and all of the interviews were obtained 
from orthopaedic surgeons.  It would have been better to gather more diverse perspectives from 
the device industry, hospitals, payers, government, and patients. 
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Results 
 
Here I will summarize the results from my investigation into appropriate joint registry 
outcome measures, foreign national registries, and domestic US registries. 
Outcome Measures 
 The feasibility and value of any joint registry rest largely on the types of outcomes data 
researchers choose to collect.  Attempting to gather too much data may discourage registry 
participation, while collecting too little data may limit the utility of the database 24 .  In the past, 
joint registries and orthopaedic surgeons have largely focused on pain and functionality 
measures when tracking patients after joint implants 25, 26 .  A wave of recent literature has 
stressed the importance of focusing on more patient-oriented measures such as quality of life 25, 
27-31 .  As the American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons (AAOS) sets out to create its own 
national joint registry in the United States, they must determine which type of outcomes data will 
be most useful down the road. 
To begin, we need to review the common terms used to describe registry data collection.  
In fact, I have not yet identified a formal set of data definitions, and it appears that registry 
proponents use language without necessarily agreeing on uniform standards.  From my 
research,  I have determined that most people mean the following when they mention data 
“levels.”  Level 1 data track implant performance and typically include patient demographics 
(age, sex, diagnosis), implant details, and operative technique.  Level 2 data track short-term 
complications such as infection rates, joint instability, and hospital readmission rates.  Level 3 
data include patient reported outcome (PRO) scores such as health-related quality of life 
measurement, satisfaction and functional status, and pain scores.  Cost data are seldom 
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collected, although Sweden, Norway, the UK, and Australia do include cost data in their 
registries.  Cost might be considered “Level 4” data, since it is likely always to attract the most 
controversy.  On the other hand, as the discussion below will make clear, people do believe that 
collection of cost data is on the horizon, so one day it may be regarded as a straightforward 
piece of information, like other Level 1 data, to be considered in value-based purchasing and 
quality improvement planning 
Several studies have analyzed the best tools for measuring health related quality of life 
(HRQL), or Level 3 data, in joint registries.  One study concluded that the two shortest 
assessment tools had the best performances: the Short Form 12 (SF-12) for generic measures 
and the Oxford-12 for disease specific examination 28 .  Another study from the New Zealand 
National Joint Registry found that, by using the Oxford hip and knee scores, they could 
accurately predict which patients were at increased risk for early failure and thus required closer 
monitoring 32 .  Unfortunately, there is no consensus in the literature or among orthopaedic 
surgeons as to the best way of measuring “Level 3” data.  Some surgeons worry that these 
measurement tools lack the sensitivity and standardization to warrant inclusion a national US 
registry 3, 24 .  In 1998, Hawker et al. sampled 1750 Medicare joint replacement patients and 
mailed each a packet with a general information questionnaire, an SF-36, and a WOMAC 
(Western Ontario and McMaster University Osteoarthritis Index).  When the vast majority of 
patients who responded to the survey reported little or no problems 2-7 years post-operation, 
the researchers realized that these HRQL tools lacked the sensitivity to detect differences in 
knee replacement patients in short-term follow-up 33 .  In light of these concerns, it is likely too 
early for the AJRR to attempt to collect data beyond Level 1. 
Table 1 shows the national registries that have begun to collect higher levels of data.  At 
least ten of the national registries collect some form of data beyond level 1, most commonly 
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patient reported outcomes (8/12), cost data (4/12), short-term complications (3/12), and  x-rays 
(2/12). 
Foreign National Joint Registries 
 Sweden established the first national hip and knee total joint registry in 1979 12 .  Over 
the next three decades, more than 20 other countries founded their own joint databases 16 .  The 
timeline (figure 1) depicts the history of national joint registries over the last 35 years but 
excludes registries that do not record data in English (Catalonia (Spain), the Czech Republic, 
France, Germany, Hungary, Moldova, Turkey, and others) 16 .  This timeline suggests that a 
process known as policy diffusion is responsible for the spread of national joint registries.  In the 
15 years after the establishment of the Swedish registry, only two other national registries were 
formed, both in Scandinavia (Finland and Norway).  In the 15 years from 1990-2005, however, 
there was a sharp increase in the number of national joint registries, as another two dozen 
popped up on three different continents.  Possible explanations for this recent increase include 
an improved ability of surgeons and hospitals to collect registry data and the fact that it took 
some 10-20 years before the true benefits of the earliest Scandinavian joint registries became 
clear. 
The details of twelve national registries, selected based on the availability of information, 
are summarized in table 2.  Professional orthopaedic societies are in charge of three quarters, 
or 9 out of 12, of the national registries, but their national governments manage the Finnish, 
Canadian, and English databases 17 .  The government is the primary source of funding for all 
national registries except for those in Germany, England, and Switzerland 17 .  Half of the twelve 
registries mandate participation by surgeons and hospitals and the overall coverage rates range 
from 60% (Germany) to nearly 100% (Finland) 16, 23 .  All national registries except that in 
Slovakia use paper documentation to collect data, but nine of the registries use at least some 
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form of electronic data entry 17, 23 .  The majority of countries make registry data publicly 
available, while only New Zealand, Slovakia, and Switzerland limit database access to 
physicians 17 . 
 Table 3 summarizes the benefits and drawbacks to six national registries.  Proponents 
claim that the major benefits of running national registries include improving the quality of joint 
replacement care, detecting defective devices, gathering epidemiological data, and reducing 
costs 10, 11, 21, 23, 34 .  The major challenges and drawbacks of national registries were 
encouraging surgeon and hospital participation, minimizing the burden of data collection and 
validation, and obtaining sufficient long-term funding 10, 11, 21, 23, 34 . 
 
Domestic US Registries 
 There is wide variation among regional joint registries in the United States.  On one end 
of the spectrum, some private surgeons track their own patients’ outcomes and record the data 
in small personal registries 35 .  On the other end, large hospital systems and academic centers 
have designed joint registries that may cover dozens or even hundreds of orthopaedic surgeons 
13, 15, 20 .   The Mayo clinic founded the first US joint registry in 1969, a full decade before 
Sweden began its own hip and knee registry 15 .  Mayo surgeons have since entered data on 
each of their almost 100,000 total joint patients 3 .  Table 4 summarizes the five domestic US 
registries included in this analysis.  Each of the registries claimed an improved ability to detect 
poorly performing devices and surgical techniques.  As an example, the Kaiser Permanente 
registry detected that patients with unicompartmental knee arthroplasties (UKA) had much 
higher revision rates than did patients who received total knee arthroplasties, a finding the 
caused network surgeons to perform fewer UKAs with an estimated systems savings of 
$550,000 20 .  The major obstacles faced by regional US joint registries included the burden and 
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cost of data collection and validation, which made it difficult to encourage surgeon and hospital 
participation.  Most of the registries collected higher levels of data, but there was little 
standardization between the types of data that registries collected.  The HealthEast registry and 
the Kaiser registry both collected cost data.  The annual cost of running a registry ranged from 
$20,000-$500,000, with per-entry rates ranging from a low of $12 (HealthEast) to a high of $500 
(UCSF) 2, 3, 13, 15, 20, 22 . 
Discussion 
 
 Over the last three decades, more than two dozen countries have established some 
form of a national joint registry.  As the Scandinavian registries matured, orthopaedic surgeons 
around the world became more convinced of the potential benefits of large scale implant 
databases.  With the help of a national registry, Sweden has reduced its revision burden to 4-
5% for total joint replacement, compared to an estimated 7-8% in the United States 12 .  The 
Norwegian registry exhibited the ability of national joint registries to detect poorly performing 
devices by successfully identifying and removing several sub-par joints from the market 34 .  As 
the younger national registries begin to achieve similar benefits, many feel that the time has 
come for the U.S. to move forward with its own national joint registry. 
Randomized controlled trials (RCTs) are the gold standard in modern evidence-based 
medicine, but they have many shortcomings in assessing joint replacement outcomes.  Several 
limitations of RCTs in arthroplasty research include their high cost, the need for extremely long-
term follow-up, and the enormous variability of devices and surgical techniques 12, 16 .  In 
Australia, for example, Orthopaedic surgeons use more than 50 different arthroplasty devices, 
so an RCT comparing only a couple devices would lack external validity for the bulk of total joint 
operations 14 .  Furthermore, since the vast majority of patients do well 10-15 years after joint 
implants, RCTs must enroll thousands of patients for many years if they hope to obtain sufficient 
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power to detect nuanced differences between devices and techniques.  Assuming an average 
revision rate of 5% at 10 years, researchers would have to randomize and follow 4,000 patients 
for at least a decade in order to have an 80% chance of detecting a standard deviation for an 
implant with a 30% worse revision rate (6.5% vs. 5%) 12 .  As a result of these challenges facing 
RCTs, establishing a national registry seems to be a relatively superior method for collecting 
long-term arthroplasty outcomes data. 
Even though the American Joint Replacement Registry (AJRR) was incorporated in 
2009, its success is far from guaranteed 35 .   While a handful of regional US joint registries have 
experienced varying levels of success, previous efforts to develop a larger national joint registry 
have failed 3, 35 .  One obstacle is the staggering size and cost of the US joint replacement 
industry.  In 2006, for example, US surgeons implanted almost 1 million artificial hips and knees 
at an aggregate cost of $37 billion 36 .   The number and cost of total joint replacements is 
increasing rapidly, with projections that the industry will cost payers $58 billion as early as 2015 
37 .  
In addition to the enormity of the American joint replacement industry, the complex and 
evolving nature of the US health care system presents its own challenges for the successful 
establishment of a national joint registry.  Most foreign countries with registries benefit from the 
simplicity of single-payer, government-run medical systems.  The decentralized, fee-for-service, 
multi-payer system in the United States complicates large-scale outcomes research.  Several 
orthopaedic surgeons have complained that the US reimbursement system is “quality blind” and 
wrongly rewards quantity over quality 38 .  In addition, the US joint industry has come under fire 
in recent years for a sometimes too cozy relationship between device manufacturers and 
surgeons.  In 2007, the four largest joint makers in the US agreed to pay $311 million in 
penalties for paying “sham” consulting fees to surgeons for choosing to use their devices 39 .  
Although such practices are thought to be less common today, the potential for graft and 
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perverse incentives remains in the system.  If the US had its own national joint database, it 
would be easier for surgeons to choose the best devices and techniques for their patients 
without biased input from the device manufacturers. 
With these challenges in mind, the AAOS must be pragmatic in its design and 
implementation of the AJRR.  If a national joint registry in the US is to succeed, it must address 
three critical factors.  First, a national registry needs to provide incentives for all stakeholders to 
participate in developing the database.  Second, the AJRR must secure robust long-term 
financial support, most likely from the government.  Finally, a successful national joint registry 
must emphasize simple and limited data collection at the start.  The following discussion 
suggests how the AAOS could best meet these criteria and thus establish a well-run national 
joint database. 
The importance of tracking long-term patient outcomes in surgery is not a new idea.  In 
the early 1900s, Ernest Codman, a pioneering American orthopaedic surgeon at Harvard, 
began to document the post-operative course for all of his patients.  When he faced resistance 
to this idea from his colleagues, Codman wrote in 1917 that “It is against the individual interests 
of the medical and surgical staffs of hospitals to follow up, compare, analyze, and standardize 
all their results… (p. 53)40 .”  Almost a century later, Codman’s words ring true in the debate 
surrounding a national joint registry in the US.  Despite the widespread belief that joint registries 
can be beneficial, each stakeholder in the debate (surgeons, device manufacturers, hospitals, 
patients, and payers) are concerned that they could lose out if the AJRR fails to consider their 
viewpoints.  History has shown that, without the support of each stakeholder group, a joint 
registry will struggle to survive. 
Foremost in the stakeholder debate are the surgeons themselves.  Many surgeons 
complain that there is simply not enough time, or money, to properly collect registry data on 
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every patient 4, 35 .  Even after data is collected, surgeons are concerned that, without proper 
risk-adjustment, data may wrongly favor surgeons who “cherry pick” patients most likely to do 
well 3, 38 .  Other surgeons fear that a joint registry could be used in medical liability cases or that 
a joint database may ultimately be used to limit their autonomy 4 .  If the AJRR is going to get 
widespread surgeon buy-in, it will have to limit the burden and cost of data collection placed on 
surgeons, ensure the validity and risk-adjustment of its data, and convince surgeons that a 
registry will be informative, but not punitive. 
Another major voice in the registry debate comes from the device manufacturers.  In 
1989, an early attempt at establishing a national joint registry in the US was abandoned in the 
face of opposition from implant makers 35 .  The device industry is mainly concerned that a 
registry will be used to mandate which implants surgeons can, and cannot, put into patients.  In 
addition, any cost-savings that a registry achieves through cost-effectiveness analysis likely 
means less revenue for some manufacturers.  In an attempt to get the device manufacturers on 
board, the AAOS has allowed for the industry to have one seat on the board of the AJRR 3 .  
While this is a good start, the AJRR must walk a fine line between including the device 
manufacturers and permitting them too much control over the registry data 2 .  In the end, it will 
be most important for the AJRR to convince the device manufacturers that a national joint 
registry could benefit them by helping to identify the best implant designs and spurring 
innovation 2 . 
Rounding out the stakeholder debate are the hospitals, patients, and payers.  I have 
grouped them together because, at first glance, these interest groups appear to have less to 
lose from a national joint registry.  Hospitals should be in favor of joint registries because they 
could help save money and meet quality reporting guidelines 35 .  Patients must understand that 
the whole point of establishing a national joint registry is to improve their outcomes and provide 
them with the best care.  In addition, registry data will provide patients with a clearer picture of 
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their own risks and benefits for joint replacement, which could provide a foundation for 
increased shared decision making with patients 2 .  Finally, payers should like the idea of a 
national registry because it has the potential to curb overutilization of expensive, unproven new 
devices and could help reduce the rate of costly revisions.  Despite all of these benefits, 
hospitals are concerned about mandates to collect new information, patients fear the privacy of 
their data, and payers worry they could foot the bill for the registry.  To assuage these concerns, 
the AJRR must remind hospitals, patients, and payers of their potential benefits from a joint 
registry and convince them that any short-term sacrifices will be counterbalanced by long-term 
gains. 
The last, and perhaps most important, group to consider in designing and implementing 
a national joint registry in the US is the government.  While Americans are more suspicious of 
big government than are citizens in some of the other countries with national registries, I see no 
way for the AJRR to succeed without federal support.  First, the AAOS estimates that a national 
joint registry will cost between $18 and $20 million annually once it is up and running 1 .  While 
the AJRR has received more than a million dollars in start-up funds from various professional 
orthopaedic societies 1 , it is extremely unlikely that groups like the AAOS and the American 
Society of Hip and Knee Surgeons could provide adequate long-term funding for the AJRR 
without imposing a per-implant tax or some other self-financing mechanism.  After all, the only 
national registries (Germany, Switzerland, and the UK) that don’t get the bulk of their funding 
from the government have struggled to get high coverage rates and produce valid data 17, 23 .  
The AJRR has shied away from government support to date because they fear that federal 
money is unreliable from year-to-year and comes with too many strings attached, most notably 
the fear that the government may manipulate the data to show the results they desire 3 . 
Beyond the funding issue, the government can help a national registry in a variety of 
ways.  First, the Medicare database already collects the majority of level 1 data on every joint 
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replacement patient over 65, omitting only laterality and implant details.  The registry could use 
the Medicare database as a foundation for the larger national registry, or at least learn from 
some of the data collection systems used by CMS.  Second, the government could help 
incentivize participation in the national registry.  The Physician Quality Reporting Initiative and 
the Reporting of Hospital Quality Data Initiative are two CMS projects that are currently pushing 
physicians and hospitals to collect more outcomes data 2 .  With the recent appointment of the 
quality-minded Don Berwick to CMS chief, more initiatives of this sort will undoubtedly be on the 
near horizon.  Third, the government could help by creating laws that could protect registry data.  
For example, the Virginia Legislature passed the Patients Rights Amendment to protect the 
state’s joint registry data from attorneys as a means to convince orthopaedic surgeons to 
participate in data collection 22 .  A similar law at the national level could ensure that registry 
data is used to change behaviors and improve performance, but not to punish surgeons, 
hospitals, or device manufacturers with sub-par performance.  Finally, the government must 
realize that it has a lot to gain from a well-run national joint registry.  As the largest payer for 
total joint replacements, CMS could see tens if not hundreds of millions of dollars in savings 
over the long-term 3 . 
The last rule for establishing a successful national joint registry in the US is to begin by 
collecting a small amount of data that is simple to record.  At the start, a national registry should 
collect only level 1 data: unique patient identification number, patient age and sex, laterality, 
diagnosis, device details, and surgical technique.  Limiting a registry to level 1 data will lessen 
the burden and cost of data collection for hospitals, surgeons, and their staff.  In addition, the 
omission of potential hot-button pieces of data like cost analysis will mean that certain 
stakeholders will have less to fear from supporting the national registry.  In the future, if the 
registry is successful, it will be possible to add higher levels of data that will enhance the value 
of the database.  The majority of orthopaedic surgeons interviewed for this paper felt that, even 
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in the short-term, it would be possible to collect higher levels of data at a subset of capable 
hospitals 2-4, 35 .  The main reason to limit the data collection at the national level is to encourage 
the smaller hospitals and practices to participate in the registry.  Essentially, it is worth trading 
higher levels of data for higher levels of participation. 
In conclusion, the time for starting a national joint registry in the US has arrived.  The 
success of foreign joint registries has shown surgeons, hospitals, and the government the 
potential benefits of a national US registry.  Even with the current momentum for the project, the 
obstacles to establishing a national joint registry are substantial.  In addition to the vast size of 
the US joint industry, the decentralized US Healthcare system and the plurality of stakeholder 
opinions create a uniquely difficult task for the AJRR.  In the face of great challenge, however, 
lies great opportunity.  If well-run, an American joint replacement registry would dwarf all of the 
other national registries.  This data could help change the behaviors of surgeons, hospitals, 
device manufacturers, payers, and even patients in an effort to achieve a safer, higher quality, 
and more efficient joint replacement care.  As Dr. David Lewallen, head of the AJRR, said, 
“Everybody’s ship floats higher if the quality of the outcome is better – everybody has a stake in 
that 3 .” 
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Tables 
 
 
 
Table 1. Higher Levels of Data Collected by National Registries 
PRO 
data 
HRQL 
Pain and 
Satisfaction 
Short-Term 
Complications 
Cost 
data 
X-rays 
Sweden, 
Finland, 
Norway, 
Denmark, New 
Zealand, 
Canada, UK, 
Switzerland 
Sweden 
(WOMACS), 
New Zealand 
(Oxford-12) 
Finland, 
Denmark, the 
UK 
Sweden, 
Norway, 
Denmark 
Sweden, 
Norway, 
Australia, 
UK 
Romania, 
Switzerland 
PRO = Patient Reported Outcome, HRQL = Health-Related Quality of Life measurement, 
WOMACS = Western Ontario and McMaster University Osteoarthritis Index 
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Table 2. Comparison of Foreign National Registries 
National 
Registry 
Leadership Funding 
Mandatory 
Participation 
(Rate) 
Form of Data 
Collection 
(Validation Method) 
Sweden (1975) OA* GOVT, RG  No P&E (crosschecks) 
Finland (1980) GOVT GOVT Yes (100%) P (rechecks, audits) 
Norway (1987) OA GOVT Yes (91-95%) Paper (crosschecks) 
Denmark (1995) OA GOVT, Hospitals Yes P&E (crosschecks) 
Germany (1997) OA OA, RG, DM No (60%) P 
Australia (1999) OA GOVT No (95-100%) P&E (crosscheck) 
New Zealand 
(1999) 
OA GOVT, RG, HIS No P&E (crosschecks) 
Canada (2001) GOVT GOVT No (70%) P&E (recheck) 
Romania (2001) OA GOVT Yes P&E (crosschecks) 
England and 
Wales (2003) 
GOVT Implant Tax 
Yes (63% in 
2003) 
P&E (Training, audits, 
crosschecks) 
Slovakia (2003) OA GOVT Yes E 
Switzerland 
(2004) 
OA OA No P&E 
*OA = Orthopaedic Association, GOVT = Government, DM = device manufacturers, HIS = 
Health Insurance Society , P = Paper, E = Electronic, RG = research grants, Coverage Rate 
provided when available 
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Table 3. Potential Benefits and Drawbacks to Foreign National Joint Registries 
Foreign National Registry Benefits Drawbacks 
Sweden (Knee 1975, Hip 
1979) 
1. Epidemiological data, 2. 
improve quality, 3. detect 
defective devices, 4. reduce 
costs  
1. Selection bias, 2. 
participation, 3. data validity, 
4. stymie innovation, 5. 
burden of data collection  
Norway (1987) 1. Detect defective implants, 
2. compare devices 
1. Participation, 2. burden of 
data collection 
Germany (1997) 1. Improve quality, 2. reduce 
costs 
1. funding, 2. participation, 3. 
data validation, 4. lack of 
implant barcodes, 5. data 
protection 
Australia (1999) 1. Improve quality, 2. 
epidemiology, 3. identify poor 
performers, 4. lower costs  
1. can not show causality,  2. 
stakeholder participation, 3. 
data validity, 4. data 
protection 
Canada (2001) 1. Epidemiological data, 2. 
improve quality 
1. participation, 2. patient 
consent, 3. burden of data 
collection, 4. surgeon and 
hospital feedback 
England and Wales (2003) 1. Spot complications early, 
2. improve quality 
1. Increasing government 
management, 2. data 
protection 
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Table 4. Regional US Registries’ Benefits, Drawbacks, Data Collection, and Funding 
Regional US 
Registry 
Benefits Drawbacks Data Funding 
Mayo 
(Rochester, 
MN), 1969 
1. Track 
complications, 2. 
epidemiological data, 
3. detect bad devices 
1. Data validation, 
2. burden of data 
collection, 3. cost, 
4. patient consent 
1. Level 1,    
2. Pain and 
Function 
Department, 
$500,000/yr 
Health East 
Hospitals (St. 
Paul, MN), 
1991 
1. Improve outcomes, 
2. epidemiological 
data, 3. detect bad 
devices 
1. Data validation, 
2. burden of data 
collection, 3. loss to 
follow-up 
1. Level 1,    
2. cost 
Private, 
$20,000/year, 
$12/procedure 
UCSF (San 
Francisco, 
CA), 1995 
1. Facilitate research, 
2. epidemiological 
data 
1. Labor intensive, 
2. costly 
1. level 1,      
2. functional 
outcomes,    
3. QOL 
$500,000/year 
for 4 surgeons, 
900 procedures 
(> $500/implant); 
funded through 
research grants 
Kaiser 
Permanente 
National Joint 
Replacement 
Registry (San 
Diego, CA), 
2001 
1. Improve outcomes, 
2. Reduce costs, 3. 
identify poor 
performers 
1. Surgeon and 
hospital 
participation,         
2. validating data 
1. Level 1,     
2. Level 2 
(infection, 
DVT), 3. 
Cost 
No data 
Virginia State 
Registry 
(Virginia), 
2003 
1. Identify  poor 
performers, 2. reduce 
costs 
1. Scale of US,     
2. US attorneys,   3. 
US healthcare 
system,                 
4. participation      
5.  manufacturers 
barcodes 
1. level 1 
data 
$50,000 in start-
up funds from 
private donation, 
some surgeon 
and hospital 
donations, no 
industry grants 
QOL = Quality of Life, DVT = Deep Venous Thrombosis 
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Figure 1. National Joint Registers Timeline
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Appendix 1 – Systematic Literature Review 
Methods: 
An initial PubMed search on 3/20/2010 with the MeSH terms “Arthroplasty” and 
“Registries” yielded 215 hits with the limitations of “last 15 years, humans, and full text.”  
An analysis of the titles of these 215 publications produced 44 papers that dealt both 
with joint registries and hip or knee replacements.  After an abstract review, any study 
that failed to deal with the benefits and drawbacks of a hip or knee joint registry with 
potential applicability to a future US joint registry were excluded and the resulting 9 full 
text publications were analyzed and included in the literature review. 
 In an effort to collect recent publications that may not have been categorized 
within the MeSH database, a second PubMed search on 3/23/2010 was conducted with 
the following search criteria: (Registry[tw] OR register[tw] or registries[tw] or registers[tw] 
OR database[tw] or databases[tw]) AND (Arthroplasty[tw] OR “knee replacement”[tw] or 
”hip replacement”[tw] or “joint replacement”[tw]) and limited to the last 90 days.  This 
search resulted in 60 hits and a review of titles excluded 53 studies that failed to discuss 
the benefits and drawbacks of hip or knee joint registries.  Of the resulting 7 articles, two 
papers were included in this systematic review based on abstract reviews. 
 Limitations of these searches include the reliance on published papers, proper 
MeSH categorization, and studies included in the PubMed database.  Several of the 
included studies are, however, themselves reviews of a variety of existing joint registers 
16, 17 .  Some of these studies included a significant portion of formerly unpublished data 
that was collected via internet searches and directly contacting joint registries 17 .  This 
search was limited to the PubMed database both for simplicity and the recognition that 
the current search began to reveal recurring results and redundant conclusions, thus 
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indicating that this review was sufficient to answer the study question without further 
evidence.  
Results: 
 The results of the 11 publications included in this systematic review are 
summarized in table A-1.  A chronological discussion of each study’s strengths, 
weaknesses, results, and conclusions helps paint a clearer picture of the potential 
benefits and best design of a National Joint Registry (NJR) in the United States.  While 
the design and structure of each study varied significantly, a detailed analysis sought to 
extract the same basic data and inferences from each publication.  The conclusion 
addresses the recurring trends from this literature review in an effort to answer the study 
question. 
 In 2010, Bohm et al. published a retrospective analysis of the Canadian National 
Joint Registry (CNJR).  The strengths of this study were its recent publication (2010) and 
its tracking and analysis of data through 2007.  Weaknesses of this publication included 
a relatively short history (CNJR began in 2000), an unsuccessful NJR (only collects data 
on 41% of eligible joint replacements), and potentially poor external validity to the United 
States.  The study mentioned that the major potential benefits of a NJR included its 
ability to collect epidemiological data and improve outcomes through surgeon and 
hospital feedback.  Challenges for establishing the CNJR included lackluster 
participation, difficult patient consent process, and a burdensome data collection process 
for busy surgeons.  In the end, Bohm et al. concluded that a successful NJR must have 
a simple consent process, streamlined data collection system, and clinically relevant 
feedback for both surgeons and hospitals 10 . 
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 Graves published an opinion piece comparing clinical trials and registries based 
on his experience with and understanding of the Australian National Joint Registry.  The 
strengths of this study included its recent publication (2010), its direct discussion of the 
benefits and drawbacks of a joint registry, and a comparison to a registry’s alternative: 
clinical trials.  As an opinion piece, this work suffered from a reliance on professional 
opinion, the lack of detailed methodology, and a potential lack of external validity outside 
of Australia.  According to Graves, the potential benefits of a NJR include improving 
patient outcomes, ongoing quality assurance, and broad inclusion of joint replacements.  
A potential shortcoming of registries included their inability to determine causality (as is 
the case with RCTs).  In conclusion, Graves claims that both RCTs and registries are 
critical to the progress of the joint replacement industry and should be used in tandem to 
ensure high-quality and efficient delivery of care 11 . 
 Serra-Sutton et al. (2009) of Spain published a comparative analysis and 
literature review of existing national joint registers.  The strengths of this article included 
a detailed methodology, a comparison of multiple foreign registries, and summary tables 
of main results.  Weaknesses of this paper were the exclusion of NJRs without websites 
or information available in English.  The results suggested that potential benefits of 
national registries include decreasing the wide variability of devices and techniques and 
controlling costs in joint replacement.  According to the authors, difficulties facing NJRs 
included incomplete participation, appropriate data collection, and the costs of 
maintaining the database.  Serra-Sutton claims that a successful NJR should have 
collaboration among all stakeholders, leadership of an orthopaedic society, and effective 
methods of data dissemination and feedback 16 . 
 In 2007, Kolling et al. published a similar study that analyzed and compared 
existing national registries.  This study benefited from a detailed methodology, a concise 
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historical review of foreign registries, summary results tables, and 100% response rate 
from contacted registries.  Several limitations of this study included an exclusion of 
registries that were not well-established, thus potentially biasing the results to favor 
successful registries.  Kolling et al. listed potential benefits of registries as facilitating 
patient and implant tracking, providing surgeon feedback, and making data publicly 
available.  Potential hurdles facing the creators of a NJR could be obtaining sustainable 
funding, using revision rates as a main outcome, getting complete participation, 
consenting patients, and a large burden of data collection.  In conclusion, the authors 
recommended that registries should use a national patient ID#, streamline data 
collection, obtain guaranteed finance, provide surgeon anonymity, and make data 
publicly available 17 . 
 In 2007, Robertsson published an informal review of several national joint 
registers in comparison with the Swedish Knee Arthroplasty Register (SKAR).  While this 
paper lacked a detailed methodology and relied on the author’s personal experience and 
expertise, its main strength was its author as Robertsson has published extensively on 
the world’s longest-standing National Joint Register.  Among the potential benefits of a 
NJR, Robertsson listed the ability to collect demographic as well as outcomes data, 
stimulate quality healthcare delivery, facilitate recalls, and reduce costs.  Potential pitfalls 
of joint registries according to Robertsson included selection bias, incomplete 
participation, invalid data, discouraging product and technique evolution, and 
overburdening data collectors.  In the end, Robertsson suggested that the keys to a 
successful creating a successful registry were using a unique patient ID#, minimizing the 
burden of data collection on surgeons, and collecting the appropriate amount of patient, 
device, and surgical data 12 . 
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 Gioe et al. (2006) conducted a retrospective analysis of the HealthEast joint 
registry, a regional database of 44 orthopedic surgeons in St. Paul, Minnesota that 
began in 1994.  Among the strengths of this paper were a detailed discussion of a US 
joint registry and a comparison with other joint registries.  Weaknesses included the 
relatively small size of the HealthEast registry and the potential for the authors to bias 
their study in favor of joint registries.  Gioe et al. claimed that potential benefits of a NJR 
were the gathering of epidemiological data, timely feedback, and the real-time 
identification of defective devices or techniques.  Several potential drawbacks included 
the incomplete collection of data, invalid data collection, use of revision rates as the 
main outcomes, and the cost of the database (calculated at $12/procedure for 
HealthEast).  Among the authors’ main conclusions for a successful joint registry were 
limiting a surgeon’s burden of data collection, facilitating cost negotiations with joint 
manufacturers, and providing surgeons with worthwhile feedback 13 . 
 In 2005, Philipson et al. performed a mailed survey of 405 orthopedic surgeons in 
England and Wales with questions about the newly implemented NJR.  Several 
strengths of this study included the collection direct surgeon feedback and reasonable 
survey design and methodology.  Drawbacks of this study were the low response rate of 
surgeons (63%), the lack of varied stakeholder perspectives, and the brevity of the 
questionnaire.  Despite these weaknesses, the authors discovered that potential benefits 
of the English joint registry from a surgeon’s perspective included detecting 
complications early and providing surgeons with feedback.  Negative aspects of the 
British joint registry in the minds of surgeons were the potential for the government to 
increase its management of the joint industry and the lack of orthopaedic surgeon 
representation of the registry board.  From this brief survey of surgeons, the authors 
concluded that keys to a successful registry included ensuring surgeons data would not 
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be used to increase government management of the industry, allowing surgeon 
leadership of the registry, and making surgeon information confidential when providing 
feedback 21 . 
 In 2004, Graves et al. published another study that was a retrospective analysis 
of the Australian National Joint Registry (ANJR).  The major strength of this work for this 
project was its discussion of the process of starting a large, nation-wide joint registry.  
Several weaknesses of the study included a lack of detailed methodology and the 
relatively short history of the ANJR (began in 1999).  Among the potential benefits of a 
NJR, Graves et al. listed epidemiological data, improved outcomes, facilitated recalls, 
device comparability, and the education of surgeons.  Potential drawbacks mentioned 
were the persistently high revision rates after joint replacement in Australia, the burden 
of paper data collection, cooperation from device manufacturers, and the choice of 
appropriate registry data.  In the end, the authors suggested that a successful registry 
should give all stakeholders a say in designing the NJR, provide confidential feedback, 
and build of existing regional registry that have been successful 14 . 
 In 2002, Swiontkowski and Maloney exchanged editorials with the former 
presenting an argument against the establishment of an American NJR and the latter 
claiming the importance of starting a US joint registry.  The strength of this publication 
was the point-counterpoint nature of the discussion among two orthopaedic surgeons 
with different viewpoints of the value of a joint registry.  The weakness of this work was 
the lack of detailed methodology and almost total reliance on the opinions of two 
surgeons.  Among the potential benefits mentioned by these authors were the ability to 
detect bad devices, facilitate recalls, and use the Medicare database as a starting point 
for the US registry.  In return, Swiontkowski argued against investment in a US joint 
registry because the idea wouldn’t work in a country without a single payer health 
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system, the high cost of data collection, the potential for selection bias, lack of 
participation, breach of privacy, and the possibility of surgeon liability. While no unified 
conclusion was drawn from this exchange, the two authors presented to options for the 
future of data collection in the US joint industry: a national registry or large clinical trials 
18 . 
 In 2000, Havelin et al. published a retrospective analysis of the Norwegian Joint 
Registry.  The main strength of this analysis was its discussion of a long-standing and 
successful joint registry (began in 1985).  Several drawbacks of this study included a 
lack of international comparisons and a joint registry that included more than just hip and 
knee replacements.  The authors motioned potential benefits of a registry to be the 
ability to detect inferior devices and compare devices.  The major hurdle to cross in 
running a registry was total participation by surgeons and hospitals.  In order to get a 
successful registry, the authors claimed that a country must get more than 95% of 
procedures, be able to track devices, and not attempt to collect too much data 19 . 
 In 1997, Berry et al. published a retrospective analysis of the Mayo Clinic joint 
registry in Minnesota.  The main strength of this study was its discussion of a long-
standing regional joint registry in the US while its weaknesses included a lack of 
international comparisons, its publication date in 1997, and the potentially poor external 
validity outside of Minnesota.  Among the potential benefits of a joint registry, Berry et al. 
mentioned the ability to discover the most effective device, technique, and patient 
selection to improve outcomes in joint replacement.  Drawbacks to starting a registry 
included low patient follow-up rates, the cost of data collection, and the continuous need 
to update and validate data.  In the end, the authors suggested that creators of a joint 
registry must not underestimate the burden of data collection and should obtain 
guaranteed long-term financing for the project 15 . 
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 Several trends emerge from an analysis of these articles.  The most commonly 
mentioned benefits of starting a joint registry included 1. the ability to detect 
underperforming joints (7 citations), 2. improving patient outcomes (5 citations), and 3. 
gathering epidemiological data in addition to outcomes data (4 citations).  On the other 
hand, the most commonly addressed challenges facing the creation of a successful joint 
registry were 1. lack of participation (6 citations), 2. obtaining long-term finance (5 
citations), 3. the burden of data collection (5 citations), and 4. the data validation process 
(5 citations).  Less cited potential benefits included the ability to provide worthwhile 
feedback (4) and reduce costs of joint implantation (2).  Less frequently mentioned 
hurdles to establishing a joint registry were obtaining stakeholder support (4), providing 
surgeon confidentiality (3), inability to determine causality as in RCTs (3), the need for 
patient consent (2), and the use of revision rates as the main outcome (2). 
Table A-1: Study Designs, Strengths, Weaknesses, and Conclusions 
Study Design; Country Strengths Weaknesses 
Potential 
Benefits 
Challenges & 
Drawbacks  
Bohm et al. 
2010 
Retrospective 
Analysis of the 
Canadian NJR; 
Canada 
Recent 
publication, 
tracking of 
data through 
2007 
New and 
struggling NJR  
(began 2000), 
may lack 
external validity 
1. 
Epidemiological 
data, 2. improve 
outcomes  
1. Participation, 
2. patient 
consent, 3. 
burden of data 
collection 
Graves. 2010 Opinion Piece 
Comparing 
Registries and 
Clinical trials; 
Australia 
Recent 
publication, 
comparison to 
alternative (i.e. 
RCTs) 
Lacks detailed 
methodology, 
relies on expert 
opinion, lack of 
external validity 
1. Improve 
outcomes, 2. no 
exclusions, 4. 
stakeholder 
participation 
1. RCT 
superiority 
Serra-Sutton 
et al. 2009 
Comparative 
Analysis and 
Literature Review 
of National 
Registers; 
Spain/England 
Detailed 
methodology, 
compares 
multiple 
existing NJRs 
Excluded any 
NJRs without 
websites or 
English 
information 
available 
1. improve 
outcomes, 2. 
control costs, 3. 
better option 
than RCTs 
1. Encouraging 
participation, 2. 
appropriate data 
collection, 3. 
Costs, 4. Data 
Validity 
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Kolling et al. 
2007 
Comparative 
Analysis and 
Literature Review 
of Existing NJRs; 
England 
Detailed 
methodology, 
Summary 
Tables, 100% 
Resp. Rate 
from NJRs 
surveyed 
Excluded 
registries that 
were not well-
established (bias 
towards 
successful NJRs) 
1. Easy patient 
and device 
tracking, 2. 
surgeon 
feedback, 3. 
publicly available 
data 
1. funding, 2. 
participation, 3. 
patient consent, 
4. burden of 
data collection 
Robertsson, 
O. 2007 
Informal Review of 
Various Knee 
arthroplasty 
registers; 
Sweden/England 
Author is 
biggest name 
in publication 
on NJRs in the 
leading NJR 
country of 
Sweden 
Lacks detailed 
methodology, 
Relies on 
personal 
experience and 
expertise 
1. demographic 
data, 2. establish 
best practices, 3. 
stimulates 
quality, 4. 
facilitates recall, 
5. reduce costs 
1. Selection 
bias, 2. 
participation, 3. 
valid data, 4. 
burden of data 
collection 
Gioe et al. 
2006 
Retrospective 
Analysis of 
Regional US Joint 
Registry; St. Paul, 
Minnesota, United 
States 
Published by 
Directors of 
HealthEast 
Registry, 
compares 
registries 
Potential bias to 
overstate registry 
success, small 
regional registry 
(44 surgeons) 
1. TJR 
epidemiology, 2. 
timely feedback, 
3. ID risk factors 
for poor 
outcomes 
1. data 
validation,       2. 
loss to follow-up,        
4. cost 
Philipson et al. 
2005 
Mailed Survey to 
405 orthopedic 
surgeons in 
England/Wales 
Direct surgeon 
feedback, 
quantitative 
data collection 
Short survey, low 
response rate 
(63%), lack of 
other stakeholder 
perspectives 
1. Spot 
complications 
early, 2. improve 
quality 
1. data 
protection,      2. 
surgeon 
representation 
Graves et al. 
2004 
Retrospective 
Analysis; Australia 
Discusses 
process of 
starting a NJR 
No detailed 
methodology, 
short history of 
ANJRR (began 
in 1999) 
1. epidemiology, 
2. improve 
outcomes, 3. 
facilitate recalls,  
1. Australian 
RRs very high 
(20-24%),  2. 
DM 
Swiontkowski 
and Maloney. 
2002 
Editorial and 
Author Reply; 
United States 
Provides both 
pro and anti-
NJR 
viewpoints 
among US 
surgeons 
Very Brief, Lack 
of Methodology, 
Expert Opinions 
1. US Medicare 
database could 
springboard 
NJR, 2. detect 
bad devices, 3. 
facilitate recall 
1. no single pay 
system, 2. cost, 
3. selection bias,               
4. participation,   
5. privacy,  6. 
liability 
Havelin et al. 
2000 
Retrospective 
Analysis of the 
Norwegian Joint 
Registry; Norway 
successful 
NJR, relatively 
long history 
(began 1985) 
Lacks 
international 
comparisons 
1. Detect inferior 
implants as early 
1. participation 
Berry et al. 
1997 
Retrospective 
Analysis of the 
Mayo Registry; 
Minnesota, US 
Analysis of 
long-standing 
US regional 
registry 
Small registry, 
Mayo is different 
from rest of US, 
13yo publication 
1. Discover most 
effective device, 
technique, and 
patient selection 
1. Patient follow-
up, 2. cost of 
registry, 3. data 
validation 
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Appendix 2 - Outcome Measurement in Total Knee Arthroplasty 
 
 The feasibility and value of any joint registry rest largely on the types of 
outcomes data researchers choose to collect.  Attempting to gather too much data may 
overburden surgeons and other information gatherers and discourage registry 
participation, while collecting too little data may limit the utility of the database.  In the 
past, joint registries and orthopaedic surgeons have largely focused on pain and 
functionality measures when tracking patients after joint implants 25, 26 .   A wave of recent 
literature has stressed the importance of focusing on more patient-oriented measures 
such as quality of life 25, 27-30, 30, 31 .   As the American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons 
(AAOS) sets out to create their own national joint registry in the United States, they must 
determine which type of outcomes data will be most useful down the road. 
 In the past, joint replacement surgeons have tracked outcomes such as mortality, 
morbidity, complication rates, and implant survival.  While these measures can be 
essential for detecting defective devices or rare systems failures, the vast majority of 
patients do not experience such negative outcomes for more than a decade 5 .  For 
example, more than 90% of patients experience little pain, functional impairment, or 
implant failure within the first 10-15 years after joint replacement 5 .  In effect, joint 
replacements have progressed to a point where these outcome measures are not 
sensitive enough to detect nuanced differences between patients’ post-operative 
courses 26, 41 . 
 In 1989, the American Knee Society set out to design a practical yet exacting 
outcome measure to better track patients’ pain and functionality after total knee 
arthroplasty (TKA).  This Knee Society Score (KSS) used clinical evaluation to quantify 
pain, stability, range of motion, and mobility on a scale ranging from 0 to 200 42 .  The 
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KSS did help standardize traditional outcome measurement and has achieved relatively 
widespread acceptance in the joint replacement literature 43-46 . Despite this success, 
some orthopaedic surgeons continue to question the usefulness and reliability of the 
KSS as an outcome measure.  In 2000, Scottish researchers examined the KSS and 
found that inter-observer variability ranged by as much as 16-21 points for the same 
exact patient 47 .  Three years later, the same researchers conducted a head-to-head 
comparison between the KSS, the British Orthopedic Association Score (BOAS), and the 
Oxford-12 and again determined that the KSS had poor reliability relative to the other 
measures 48 .  While these studies had small sample sizes and forced surgeons to use 
foreign assessment tools, they do raise important questions about the utility and 
accuracy of the KSS.  In addition to reliability issues, the KSS requires surgeons or other 
data collectors to spend a significant amount of time assessing patients, recording data, 
and calculating scores.  When considering the possibility of including measures like KSS 
in a joint registry, it appears that this traditional measure would be both too unreliable 
and overly burdensome to information gatherers to be of clinical or practical value. 
 Orthopaedic surgeons thus find themselves in a true Catch-22 when it comes to 
appropriate outcome measures for joint replacement patients.  Traditional measures like 
mortality and implant survival have become less useful as their incidence has declined, 
while more sensitive measures of pain and functionality like the KSS suffer from poor 
reliability and the overburdening of data collectors.  In an effort to bypass this dilemma, a 
growing number of researchers and surgeons have begun to support the collection of 
qualitative outcomes in joint replacement. 
 While the push for measuring quality has surged recently in orthopedics, the idea 
of tracking and quantifying patient satisfaction and quality of life is far from new.  Since 
the 1970s, what is now the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) has 
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been developing tools to analyze patients’ health status.  The major goal of AHRQ has 
been to gather and make available data that will result in improved clinical decisions and 
ultimately better population health 49 .  In the 1980s, increasing awareness of the value of 
health status and quality of life measures sparked a debate over the future importance of 
Healthcare Related Quality of Life (HRQL) 50 .  Most conceptualizations of HRQL include 
dimensions of physical and social function, mental health, and general health 
perceptions 51 .  In recent years, orthopaedic surgeons have begun to view HRQL 
measures as a potentially essential tool to assess the outcomes of joint replacement 
patients 41 . 
 Health Related Quality of Life measures are broadly categorized as generic or 
disease specific.  Generic measures are useful for assessing overall health status and 
offer the most generalizable comparisons between different diseases and populations 50 .  
Among the hundreds of generic measures to assess HRQL are the Short Form 36 (SF-
36), quality of well being (QWB) scale, and the Nottingham Health Profile 27, 33 .  Disease 
specific measures, on the other hand, are designed to assess more limited disease 
states and smaller patient populations and often benefit from being more simple, cheap, 
and reliable than generic measures.  Examples of more disease specific HRQL 
measures pertinent in orthopaedics include the Western Ontario and McMaster 
University’s Index of Osteoarthritis (WOMAC), Lequesne, and the Oxford-12 25 .   While a 
myriad of generic and disease specific measures are available for researchers to assess 
HRQL, orthopaedic surgeons must design or choose the best available tests to consider 
for use in a widespread data collection effort like a joint registry. 
 Fortunately, the joint replacement literature contains a modest number of articles 
that assess the utility of various HRQL measures.  In fact, several countries have 
actually begun to use HRQL measures to determine how best to use limited medical 
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resources.  The National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) in Britain 
uses quality and cost-effective measures such as quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) to 
assess and improve patient outcomes 52 .  In Sweden, where a national joint registry has 
existed for decades, researchers recently conducted a study assessing several HRQL 
measures for knee replacement patients.  In this cross-sectional mailed survey of a 
random sample of 3600 Swedish TKA patients, investigators compared four generic 
(Nottingham Health Profile, SF-12, SF-36, and Sickness Impact Profile) and three 
disease specific questionnaires (Lequesne, Oxford 12-item Knee Score, and WOMAC) 
based on response rate, time to complete, validity, and reliability.  After analyzing their 
results, the researchers concluded that the two shortest assessment tools had the best 
performances: the SF-12 for generic measures and the Oxford-12 for disease specific 
examination 28 .   This study again exhibits the advantages to using practical and concise 
assessment tools when collecting large volumes of population health data. 
Of course, any tool that attempts to measure quality outcomes struggles from the 
same challenges that face traditional outcome measures in orthopedics like mortality 
and failure rates.  Foremost among these challenges is striking the appropriate balance 
between creating an assessment tool that is sensitive enough to detect subtle variations 
in outcomes, while avoiding measurement strategies that are overly complex and difficult 
to conduct or analyze.  In 1998, Hawker et al. sampled 1750 Medicare TKA patients and 
mailed each a packet with a general information questionnaire, an SF-36, and a 
WOMAC.  When the vast majority of patients who responded to the survey reported little 
or no problems 2-7 years post-operation, the researchers realized that these HRQL 
tools, much like their traditional TKA outcome measure counterparts, lacked the 
sensitivity to detect differences in knee replacement patients 33 .  While there is certainly 
a possibility that Hawker et al. simply failed to wait long enough after a TKA for outcome 
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variations to manifest, this study warns of implementing HRQL measures on a 
population-wide basis. 
 In conclusion, the wide variety of traditional and qualitative outcome measures 
leaves the creators of a national joint registry in a conundrum.  Traditional outcome 
measures such as mortality, clinical pain and function, and implant survival have been 
measured for decades but often fail to detect nuanced differences in modern artificial 
joints.  Investigational qualitative measures offer lots of promise but are difficult to 
quantify, lack widespread acceptance, and can be time consuming and burdensome to 
administer.  In light of these challenges, I feel that a nascent joint registry in the US must 
first focus on the traditional outcome measures simply because they are easy to record 
and interpret.  Even if they are less sensitive then they used to be, the number of annual 
TKAs has already surpassed 500,000 in the United States alone and is rapidly 
increasing.  With such a huge number and variety of implants, it will still be essential for 
a joint registry to track traditional outcomes in order to detect rare device defects or 
failures in addition to expected failure rates ten or twenty years post-implantation.  As for 
quality measures, it seems that the time is not yet appropriate to incorporate tools such 
as the SF-36, QWB scale, or the WOMAC because they have been shown too 
overburden data collectors and also lack sensitivity in measuring TKA outcomes.  If 
anything, the shortest and most concise quality measures like the SF-12 and the Oxford-
12 hold the most potential benefit for a joint registry.  In the end, creating a registry at all 
is an enormous challenge and step forward for the US joint replacement industry and 
researchers must not overcomplicate the database and risk losing the current 
momentum for the project. 
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Appendix 3 – Foreign National Joint Registries 
 
 On May 3, 2010 the newly formed board of the American Joint Replacement 
Registry held its first meeting 3 .  Thirty-five years before that meeting, the first national 
joint registry was formed in Sweden in 1975 12 .  Since that time, more than twenty other 
countries have established their own national joint registry.  Of these, fifteen registers 
are documented in English and at least another eight are kept in other languages, 
including Catalonia (Spain), the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Moldova, 
Slovakia, and Turkey 16 .  Even Malawi has recently established a national register for 
knee and hip replacements 53 .  While the experience of each national registry is 
somewhat unique, their relative successes and failures can provide important lessons for 
the AAOS as it sets out to establish the first American National Joint Replacement 
Registry. 
 While most of the international literature admits that all registries have their flaws 
and limitations, many researchers agree that national registers are the best way to track 
arthroplasty outcomes 12, 16 .  Randomized controlled trials (RCTs) are the gold standard 
in modern evidence-based medicine but they have many shortcomings in assessing joint 
replacement outcomes.  Several limitations of RCTs in arthroplasty research include 
their high cost, the need for extremely long-term follow-up, and the enormous variability 
of devices and surgical techniques 12, 16 .  In Australia, for example, Orthopedic surgeons 
use more than 50 different arthroplasty devices, so an RCT comparing only a couple 
devices would lack external validity for the bulk of total joint operations 14 .  Furthermore, 
since the vast majority of patients do well 10-15 years after joint implants, RCTs must 
enroll thousands of patients for many years if they hope to obtain sufficient power to 
detect nuanced differences between devices and techniques.  Assuming an average 
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revision rate of 5% at 10 years, researchers would have to randomize and follow 4,000 
patients for at least a decade in order to have an 80% chance of detecting a standard 
deviation for an implant with a 30% worse revision rate (6.5% vs. 5%) 12 .  As a result of 
these challenges facing RCTs, the process of establishing a national registry seems to 
be a relatively reasonable method for collecting long-term arthroplasty outcomes data. 
 While each country’s healthcare system presents unique challenges, all national 
joint registers face many of the same obstacles: encouraging surgeon and patient 
participation, collecting worthwhile and valid data, and obtaining long-term guaranteed 
financing.  Joint replacement surgeons may understand and appreciate the benefits of a 
national registry, but many fear that such data collection systems could increase their 
workload, sacrifice their autonomy in selecting certain devices and techniques, or even 
as evidence against them in malpractice disputes.  Only a handful of the national 
registers mandate participation, and as a result coverage rates range from lows in 
Germany (60%) and Canada (70%) to inclusion of almost 100% of procedures in 
Denmark, Australia, and Finland 14, 16, 23 .  In an attempt to maximize surgeon 
participation and increase coverage rates, some national registries have formed steering 
committees, performed clinical audits, guaranteed anonymous data-reporting, or created 
formal training programs for the entering registry data 16, 34 .  The Australian registry, 
which began in 1999, took a piecemeal approach to obtaining surgeon and hospital 
participation by progressively expanding the register state-by-state until they achieved 
near 100% coverage in 2002 14 .  Another barrier to near-complete registry coverage is 
lack of patient participation.  In 2003, for example, only 63% of British patients provided 
their consent for registry participation and only 90% of patients agreed in Canada 17 .  To 
get around this problem, the majority of registries don’t require patient consent or make it 
more challenging for patients to opt out of having their data included 17 . 
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 A second hurdle for national registers is choosing an effective way to collect and 
validate registry data.  All national registers use implant survival, determined by time to 
revision, as the main registry outcome 12, 17 .  To collect this data, most registers have 
either a paper or electronic form filled out at the time of operation that includes a patient 
identification number, details of the implant and operation, and information about the 
hospital where the operation occurred 16 .  Currently, the bulk of the information is 
recorded on paper since several national registers have complained that electronic data 
entry is still more costly and time-consuming 14, 16, 17 .  Many surgeons have interest in 
collecting higher levels of data such as patient satisfaction and quality-of-life, but only a 
minority of national registries have successfully began to document this information 16, 17 .  
As a result of these experiences, it seems that an American joint registry should begin 
by collecting a minimum of essential data on paper before advancing to higher levels of 
data or electronic entry of registry information. 
 A brief discussion of the failed German joint registry helps illustrate the 
importance of obtaining long-term guaranteed financing in the establishment of a 
national joint registry.  Almost all foreign registers receive the bulk of their financing from 
the government, with the only exceptions being the English registry, where a per-implant 
fee supports the cost of data collection, and the German registry, which attempted but 
failed to secure sufficient funding from the German Orthopaedic Association (GOA) and 
manufacturer grants 16, 17, 23 .  Part of the problem with the German registry was its 
underestimation of the actual costs of running a joint registry.  The GOA felt that a 
national registry would be self sustaining with a per-implant surcharge of $6-8, while 
other long-standing registers like Norway and Sweden have shown that entering and 
properly validating registry data actually costs $15-18, approximately twice as much as 
the Germans predicted 13 .  As a result, the underfunded German registry struggled to 
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properly input registry data as 31% of implants lacked proper identification and 6% of 
registry entries did not even include the date of operation, thus making it impossible to 
obtain critical outcomes measures such as time to revision 23 .  Other lessons from the 
German experiment include the need for manufacturers to share their implant barcode 
information with the registry and the need to have mechanisms in place to ensure that 
data collection is complete and valid 23 .  As a result, the German registry represents an 
unfortunate example of what can happen when a national joint registry is not well-
planned or properly financed.  Of particular concern for the AJRR is the fact that it, 
similar to Germany, will attempt to finance the registry through professional society 
grants and a per-implant charges on each device 3 . 
 Despite the failings of the German joint registry, most countries have 
experienced varying degrees of success in establishing their national joint registries.  
The long-standing Swedish arthroplasty register has helped reduce their revision burden 
to 4-5%, compared to an estimated 7-8% in the United States 12 .  Registries have also 
proven successful in their ability to detect poorly performing devices and techniques as 
the Norwegian registry has withdrawn several uncemented and two cemented implants 
from the market 34 .  The Australian registry has learned that, in the rare case of a device 
recall, a national register is the only efficient way to track down and notify patients who 
received a specific implant 14 .  In addition, national joint registries have succeeded in 
collecting valuable demographic data, stimulating hospitals and surgeons to perform at 
their best, and providing the opportunity for cost analyses 12 . 
 In the end, a review of foreign national joint registries yields several important 
lessons for the AAOS as they shape the first American joint registry.  First, the AJRR 
must appeal to both surgeons and patients since, without their support, a national 
registry is unlikely to obtain sufficient coverage to provide valid data.  Other national 
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registers have learned that surgeons and patients must be protected by de-identifying 
data and ensuring confidentiality in reporting outcomes.  Second, the AJRR must have 
safeguards to ensure the quality and validity of the data it collects.  This process begins 
by selecting a few easily measured outcomes that can form the base of the registry 
information, such as time to revision.  After choosing what data is appropriate for 
collection, the AJRR must design ways to confirm that data is both complete and 
accurate, such as cross-checking data with hospital or manufacturer records.  Finally, 
the AJRR must make accurate projections about the cost of running a national joint 
registry and be certain that they have obtained robust, long-term financing for the 
project.  As the German example warned, a poorly funded registry will sputter and fail to 
produce worthwhile outcomes data.  In conclusion, the AAOS must design a registry that 
collects simple but reliable data on almost all (>90%) total hip and knee arthroplasties in 
the country. 
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Appendix 4 – Interview Consent, Protocol, and Summary Table 
 
Evaluating the Potential Benefits and Plausibility of a National Joint Registry in the 
United States 
 
James Fraser 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
 
 
IRB Study #:    Consent Form Version Date:   
 
Principal Investigator:    James Fraser 
UNC-Chapel Hill Department:   Public Health Leadership 
 
Faculty Advisor:     Sue Tolleson-Rinehart, PhD 
UNC-Chapel Hill Department:    Public Health Leadership & Pediatrics 
       
Advisor Phone #:      919.843.9477 
Advisor E-mail:    suetr@unc.edu 
 
Study Contact Phone #:      704-516-5359 
Study Contact E-mail:     james_fraser@med.unc.edu 
 
[Introductory script, embedding study information and agreement to participate:] 
Hello, I am Jamie Fraser.  Thank you so much for talking with me today.  I am an 
MD/MPH candidate at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.  Currently, I am 
conducting research to fulfill the requirements of the Masters of Public Health degree in 
the Health Care & Prevention program at UNC.   
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I have asked to interview you because of your knowledge of joint replacement registries.  
I am interested specifically in your views of how joint registries can and cannot contribute 
to better joint replacement outcomes.     
My advisor for this research is Dr. Sue Tolleson-Rinehart, who is a faculty member of the 
UNC Schools of Public Health and Medicine.  We hope that this project can advance 
understanding of the role of registries in improving orthopaedic quality of care.  To this 
end, we hope that the results of this study will be published in a scholarly journal. 
The interview will consist of several open-ended questions, and should last anywhere 
from 20 minutes to one hour, depending on the availability of your time and what you 
want to tell me.  You have the right to end the interview at any time.  I would like to 
record this interview on a digital voice recorder to ensure that I have the most accurate 
record of your comments.  However, I will not record this interview without your 
permission.   
 
If you do grant permission for this conversation to be recorded, you have the right to 
revoke recording permission at any time.  The digital interview files created will be kept 
password-protected on my computer and the computer of my faculty advisor, Dr. 
Tolleson-Rinehart, until I transcribe the interview.  After the transcript is made, the files 
will be deleted.  This transcript will also be kept password-protected on our computers, 
and only Dr. Tolleson-Rinehart and I will know this password.  I will be happy to provide 
you with a copy of the interview’s transcript at your request. 
I will not identify your comments by name in my written work unless you grant me 
permission to do so today.  If you do not grant this permission, I will identify you by 
position only – for example, “An orthopedic surgeon at an Eastern academic medical 
center.”   
If you have any questions about the research now, please ask.  If you have questions 
later about the research, please contact me by phone at 704-516-5359 or by e-mail at 
james_fraser@med.unc.edu or jfraser7@gmail.com      
Dr. Tolleson-Rinehart and I hope to publish the results of this project, and will be glad to 
make findings available to you.  If you wish to ask Dr. Tolleson-Rinehart any questions 
about the study, please send a message to suetr@unc.edu or call 919.843.9477. 
Before we continue, would you please agree to any or all of the statements I’m about to 
read?   
   I AGREE to having this interview tape recorded with a digital voice recorder.   
 
   I  GIVE PERMISSION for the following information to be included in publications 
resulting from this study: 
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  my name     my title        direct quotes from this interview  
 
 
                                                                        .                                                   . 
 
Name of Participant     Date 
 
 
Thank you for your help with my project!  Now we are ready to begin. 
 
Interview Protocol 
 
1. As you know, the US has not previously had national joint registries.  In your 
view, why is the AAOS now setting out to do this in the US? 
 
2. I have searched and read the literature on joint registries, and I think I 
understand them, but I would greatly value knowing your views.  In general, what do you 
think are the main benefits to establishing a national joint registry in the United States? 
 
3. And what roadblocks to getting the registry established do you see? 
 
4. Does your own orthopaedics service track patient outcomes after total joint 
replacements?  
 
4.a. (if yes)     How do you do it?  What information do you collect? 
 
4.b. (If no)  Can you tell me why your service isn’t doing this now?  
 
5. Thinking about the national registry again, what data do you think it is most 
critical for the registry to include? 
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5.a. (if they do NOT spontaneously mention this):  Do you think it will be important for 
a registry to collect data like patient satisfaction and patient-reported health-Related 
Quality of Life data? 
 
6.   I understand that a national registry is likely to require collaboration between 
surgeons, manufacturers, hospitals, patients, and payers in establishing a registry.  Can 
you tell me what roles you think these different groups will play? 
 
6.a. In your view, which of these groups is likely to have the most influence in shaping 
what the registry will look like? 
 
7. And what about a government role in establishing a registry?  What should that 
role be?   
 
7a. (If NOT spontaneously mentioned):  Should the government fund the creation of 
the registry, do you think?    
 
7.b. What policies or legislation do you think might help establish a national joint 
registry?  For example, the Virginia state registry pushed for the enactment of a Patients’ 
Rights Amendment that prohibited attorneys from accessing registry data – do you think 
these or other kinds of policies should be implemented in a national registry? 
 
8. Finally, who should have access to registry data?  The general public?  Just 
Surgeons?  Researchers?  Device manufacturers? 
 
Thank you very much for your time!  I greatly appreciate it!  Is there anything I haven’t 
thought of that you’d like to add?  I will be happy to provide you with a copy of this 
interview’s transcript, if you would like.  Thank you again!  
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Table A-4: Interview Results 
Interviewee 
NJR 
Benefits 
NJR 
Roadblocks 
Stakeholders Funding Registry Data Data Access 
David Lewallen, 
MD, Chair of 
American Joint 
Replacement 
Registry, 
Professor of 
Orthopedics at 
Mayo Clinic 
1. Improve 
outcomes, 2. 
detect poorly 
performing 
implants, 3. 
provide valid 
data 
1. IT support, 
2. Non-
Liability Legal 
Issues, 3. Size 
of US, 
4.privacy, 5. 
Cherry Picking 
AJRR board 
includes 7 
orthopedic 
surgeons, 1 
insurance, 2 
industry, 1 AHA, 
1 patient (6 
others)  
Professional 
Societies, 
Insurance, 
Hospitals, DM 
, GOVT on a 
pay-for-data 
or study basis 
Level 1 at first 
(patient, 
hospital, and 
implant data), 
later more 
robust SF-36 or 
WOMAC, x-ray 
Illinois has 
strong 
safeguards for 
registry data. 
De-ID data can’t 
be of much legal 
help  
Kevin Bozic, 
MD/MBA, 
Associate 
Professor and 
Vice Chair of 
Orthopedics at 
UCSF; Chair of 
the California 
Joint 
Replacement 
Registry Project 
1. Improve 
quality of 
care, 2. better 
understand 
RFs for TJR,  
1. Simple and 
cheap data 
collection, 2. 
participation 
incentives 
(GOVT role), 
3. risk-
adjustment of 
data 
Surgeons (data 
protection), 
hospitals, DM 
(markets), 
payers (value), 
government 
(overutilization), 
and patients 
(quality) 
Each SH pays 
(except 
patients); per-
implant fees 
would give the 
DM too much 
control over 
data 
Level 1 at first 
(patient demo, 
technique/impla
nt data, RR), 
HRQL in a 
subset of 
centers that are 
capable 
should be public 
(if risk-adjusted), 
initially must be 
protected to get 
surgeon 
participation.  
Illinois has 
strong laws  
Bradley Vaughn, 
MD/FACS, 
Raleigh 
Orthopaedics 
Joint 
Reconstruction 
Specialist 
1. Improve 
quality, 2. 
identify poorly 
performing 
devices, 
surgeons, or 
hospitals 
1. Limit 
autonomy, 2. 
data validity, 
3. cost, 4. 
cherry picking, 
5. participation 
of small 
practices 
Surgeon 
(autonomy), DM 
(profits), 
Hospital (cut 
implant costs) 
Mainly GOVT 
(saves $ long-
term), small 
grants  from 
other SH, Not 
DM, per-
implant fee 
Level 1 at first 
(pt demo, 
implant details, 
dxn, BMI, 
technique), later 
QOL in a subset 
Ultimately 
should be 
public, surgeons 
will need 
protection at 
beginning as 
data evolves 
David Jacofsky, 
MD, Chair of the 
CORE Institute 
in Phoenix, AZ 
1. implant 
tracking, 2. 
potential to 
get patient 
QOL data 
1. Burden of 
data collection 
2. Cost, 3. 
data to collect 
All SH need 
incentives to 
participate 
1. Ideally 
GOVT, 2. 
Industry - 
possible bias, 
3. Private  
1. Ideally PRO, 
not just revision 
rates, 2. better if 
not de-identified 
1. Definitely 
surgeons, 2. 
data will be 
public 
Paul Lachiewicz, 
MD, Joint 
Reconstruction 
Specialist. 
Chapel Hill, NC 
1. Early 
warning 
system for 
bad implants 
1. funding, 2. 
medico-legal, 
3. DM, 4. 
participation 
1. surgeons, 2. 
DM (profit, rep), 
3. +/- hosp, 4. 
payers (potential 
gain) 
1. GOVT, 2. 
surgeons, 3. 
DM (must be 
per-implant) 
1. Level 1 (age, 
gender, implant 
type, dxn, +/- 
BMI) 
Medico-Legal 
issues 
DM = Device Manufacturer, GOVT = government, SF-36 = Short Form 36, WOMAC = Western Ontario 
and McMaster Osteoarthritis Index, SH = Stakeholder, dxn = diagnosis, QOL = quality of life, RR = 
Revision Rate, RF = Risk Factors, BMI = Body Mass Index 
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